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NFL’S LITIGATION SKATES ONTO THE ICE
MELANIE A. ORPHANOS*
***
This article addresses the insurance implications of the pending concussion
litigation between the National Hockey League and its current and former
players. The author draws comparisons to similar litigation brought
against the National Football League and the NFL's interactions with its
insurers to forecast the obstacles the parties in the NHL litigation will face
in establishing coverage by the many insurance carriers who have insured
the NHL over time. The author identifies obstacles including determining
the moment when coverage is “triggered” and whether certain actions by
the NHL will preclude coverage and relieve the insurers of their duty to
defend because of the policies’ “expected or intended” clauses.
***

I.

INTRODUCTION

Days before the National Football League (“NFL”) kicked off its
2013 season, it took strides toward resolving the biggest legal threat in its
ninety-four year history: concussion litigation. The NFL made a
preliminary settlement with approximately 4,500 former players and agreed
to pay $765 million.1 In the settlement, the NFL included a specific
provision explaining that the settlement “cannot be considered an
admission by the NFL of liability, or an admission that plaintiffs’ injuries
were caused by football.”2 While many assumed that this settlement would
be accepted, the judge handling this litigation denied preliminary approval
*

University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2014. I
would like to thank Professor Patricia McCoy for her invaluable assistance in
writing this Note through multiple drafts. I would also like to thank my mother and
best friend, Leona Chodosh, for her unwavering support and for inspiring me to
always chase my dreams.
1
Arthur L. Caplan & Lee H. Igel, What’s Unsettled About the NFL
Concussions Settlement, FORBES.COM (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/leeigel/2013/08/30/whats-unsettled-about-the-nfl-concussions-settlement/.
2
Mark Fainaru-Wada, et al., NFL, Players Reach Concussion Deal,
ESPN.COM, (Aug. 29, 2013), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9612138/judge-nflplayers-settle-concussion-suit.
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of the settlement.3 In the coming months, the NFL will likely try to
restructure this settlement, or at a minimum, prove that it is fair through
appropriate documentation in order to put this case behind it.
The settlement will be historic, as it will change all contact sport
organizations and how they approach concussions, but its likely settlement
is a bit unsettling, as it will allow the NFL to avoid answering numerous
questions that could have resulted in a multi-billion dollar case.4
Despite the NFL concussion litigation settlement being imminent,
the NFL’s insurers’ responsibility for paying for this settlement is still
uncertain.5 The insurers’ duty to indemnify is unlikely to be triggered
because there is evidence that the NFL committed intentional torts that
would be excluded from coverage. Conversely, the insurers’ duty to
defend seems more definite and it is likely that under the NFL’s current
Comprehensive General Liability (“CGL”) policies, the NFL’s insurers’
duty to defend will be triggered through the settlement process thus far and
through trial if the settlement negotiations are unsuccessful. While it
appears that, eventually, this litigation will be resolved in a settlement,
some players may still choose to opt out of the settlement if one is
reached.6
As the NFL’s insurers’ duty to defend would likely be triggered,
these insurers should take a closer look at their policies moving forward.
However, the NFL’s insurers are not the only ones who should be
evaluating their policies for potential exposure. In fact, all insurers of
contact sports in the United States must evaluate the policies they are
offering to their contact sport insureds in this concussion era. This includes
the National Hockey League (“NHL” or the “League”) who, mere months
3

Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No.
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2014) at 10.
4
See Rick Maese & Cindy Boren, NFL, Former Players Settle Concussion
Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201308-29/sports/41578247_1_former-players-nfl-players-association-nfl-retirees.
5
Sheena Harrison, NFL Settles Concussion Claims, but Insurers’ Role in
Paying
Costs
Still
Unclear,
Bus.
Ins.,
(Sept.
8,
2013),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130908/NEWS06/130909875.
6
See, e.g., Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Lawyer Blasts Concussion
(Jan.
14,
2014),
Agreement,
ESPN.COM
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10295307/attorney-blasts-concussion-dealrecommend-clients-continue-sue-nfl (Some of the players’ lawyers have suggested
that even if the NFL concussion litigation does eventually settle, certain players
will choose to opt out of the settlement agreement and continue to sue the NFL.).
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after the NFL and its players reached a preliminary settlement, are now
facing similar concussion litigation.7 In the NHL, a similar class action
lawsuit currently consisting of ten former players “seek[ing] to represent a
class of more than 10,000 retired NHL players”8 is alleging, among other
claims, fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment, fraudulent
misrepresentation by nondisclosure, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
negligence.9 These types of large, player-led, class action lawsuits will
undoubtedly change the face of contact sports forever and will require
insurers to decide if they should change the policies they offer to their
contact sport insureds or insure them at all.
As some concussion litigation may proceed in the NFL, and as the
NHL has its own upcoming litigation, both of these organizations will
likely turn to their insurers to defend and indemnify them. This Note
focuses on the numerous insurance issues that will be addressed in both
class actions by examining the progress made thus far in both cases. More
specifically, this Note discusses these insurance issues by examining some
of the arguments that the NFL’s insurers did advance,10 which the NHL’s
insurers may also advance, to potentially limit or nullify their liability to
the leagues. Additionally, this Note evaluates the likelihood that if
concussion litigation does proceed to trial, courts will implement a
continuous trigger theory to decide when the insured’s policies are
triggered. Due to the resulting potential liability of such a theory, insurers
have an even stronger incentive to alter their policies going forward to
avoid future exposure for millions of dollars to current and former injured
players.
Parts I and II discuss the medical background of concussions and
the general history of the NFL concussion litigation. Part III examines the
arguments that were left unanswered in the NFL concussion litigation and
how they are likely to unfold in the NHL concussion litigation.
Part IV concludes that a continuous trigger theory would likely be
used to determine insurance coverage in circumstances such as the
7

See, e.g., Paul D. Anderson, Concussion Litigation Strikes the NHL, NFL
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/ ?p=1542.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Leeman, Aitken, et. al. v. Nat’l Hockey
League & NHL Bd. of Governors, No. 1:13-cv-01856 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2013) at
36-46.
10
Paul D. Anderson, NFL’s Insurer Balks at Concussion Defense, NFL
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Sept. 16, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1026.
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concussion litigation presenting latent harm. Specifically, there are three
competing theories about what triggers coverage for concussion injuries:
the initial exposure trigger theory, the manifestation trigger theory, and the
continuous trigger theory. This Part argues that a CGL policy is triggered
at the point of exposure to a mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”) through
the time when a players’ neurological disease manifests itself.
Accordingly, using either the point of exposure or the point of
manifestation alone to trigger insurance policies would not align with the
reasonable expectations of the insured, as the injury does not occur at either
of these discrete moments. Moreover, because it is extremely difficult to
determine exactly when the players’ MTBIs occurred, the manifestation
trigger theory and the initial exposure trigger theory would be too difficult
to implement. In cases presenting this type of latent harm, a continuous
trigger would be the best approach to determine when an insurance policy
is triggered, considering this difficulty of ascertaining when the players’
injuries “occurred.” As such, insurers should address this in their policies,
and some insurers may choose to do so by adding concussion exclusions or
providing a definition for “trigger” in the event of a concussion.
Part V considers that the insurers will likely argue that the League
intended or expected the injuries that the players suffered, which may
exclude these injuries from coverage. Finally, Part VI explains that there is
a strong likelihood that the insurers will be required to defend the League
under their current insurance policies despite the fact that the players’
claims may potentially not be covered.
II.

MEDICAL BACKGROUND

The NFL concussion litigation greatly heightened concern for
concussions in not only the NFL, but in all contact sports. For this reason,
it is likely that sports’ medical personnel nationwide will focus more on the
causes and diagnoses of concussions for the foreseeable future. The
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (“AANS”) defines a
concussion as an “injury to the brain that results in temporary loss of
normal brain function, [which is typically] caused by a blow to the head.”11
11

See Concussion, AM. ASSOC. OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS (Dec. 2011),
http://www.aans.org/Patient%20Information/Conditions%20and%20Treatments/C
oncussion.aspx (explaining that neurosurgeons and other brain-injury experts
emphasize that although “some concussions are less serious than others, there is no
such thing as a ‘minor concussion’”).
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The AANS notes that concussions are serious injuries and cautions that
“[e]ven mild concussions should not be taken lightly.”12 When concussions
are ignored or otherwise improperly treated prior to a player reentering a
game or practice, that player is more likely to suffer another concussion.13
This is especially troubling because sources suggest that the harm caused
by concussions has a cumulative effect and can result in
neuropsychological impairment and neurologic abnormalities.14 This link
between concussions and neurologic abnormalities and diseases has been
illustrated by numerous players’ stories.15 In fact, in 2012, researchers
announced that thirty-four NFL players “whose brains were studied
suffered from chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”), a degenerative
brain disease brought on by repeated hits to the head that results in
confusion, depression and, eventually, dementia.”16
CTE has also been discovered in former hockey players’ brains.17
For instance, in 2011 the brain of Derek Boogaard, a twenty-eight-year-old
hockey player, was studied after he died from what was ruled an accidental
12

Id.
Michael W. Collins & Kristen L. Hawn, The Clinical Management of Sports
Concussion, 1 CURRENT SPORTS MED. REPORTS 12, 12 (2002).
14
Id. See AM. ASSOC. OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, supra note 11
(cautioning that one concussion soon after another “does not have to be very strong
for its effects to be deadly or permanently disabling”).
15
See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, CTE, a Degenerative Brain Disease, Found in 34
Pro Football Players, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/
Health/cte-degenerative-brain-disease-found-34-pro-football/story?id=17869457
(“Researchers at Boston University's Center for the Study of Traumatic
Encephalopathy published the largest case series study of CTE to date, according
to the center. Of the 85 brains donated by the families of deceased veterans and
athletes with histories of repeated head trauma, they found CTE in [sixty-eight] of
them. Of those, [thirty-four] were professional football players, nine others played
college football and six played only high school football.” Additionally, several
NFL players have committed suicide in recent years whose brains contained CTE
including former Kansas City Chiefs player Jovan Belcher, former NFL players
Junior Seau, Dave Duerson, former Pittsburgh Steelers player Terry Long, and
former Philadelphia Eagles player Andre Waters.).
16
Id.
17
See John Branch, Derek Boogaard: A Brain ‘Going Bad,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-abrain-going-bad.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. (In the preceding two years, CTE was
also discovered in the brains of two other former NHL players, Reggie Fleming
and Rick Martin.).
13
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overdose.18 The neuropathologist at the Boston University’s Center for the
Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy, who has examined nearly eighty
brains of former athletes, was shocked by how advanced the degree of
brain damage was in such a young player.19 A few months after Boogaard’s
death, two more young NHL players were found dead: Rick Rypien, a
twenty-seven-year-old player who committed suicide, and Wade Belak, a
twenty-seven-year-old player who reportedly hanged himself.20 At the time
of this writing, it appears that neither player’s brain was studied for CTE.21
A. NFL LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT
As more news surfaced of past contact sports players who
committed suicide and had CTE in their brains, numerous NFL players
took a historic step and brought a class action lawsuit against the NFL. In
August 2011, the first professional football players filed lawsuits against
the NFL alleging more than ten counts, including fraudulent concealment,
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence.22 The players’ claims
centered around the premise that the NFL did know, or at least should have
known, about the potentially serious implications of sustaining concussions
and not only failed to inform players, but also intentionally hid this
information from them.23 If these lawsuits proceed to court, the players
would face numerous obstacles. Obstacles include possible dismissal due
to arbitration clauses in the collective bargaining agreements that they
entered into with the League,24 difficulty proving that their injuries
18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Pat Hauldren, NHL Enforcers Deadly and Dying, EXAMINER.COM
(Sept. 2, 2011) http://www.examiner.com/article/nhl-enforcers-deadly-and-dying.
22
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, In Re:
Nat’l Football, No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 2012).
23
See generally id. at 15-44.
24
The League argued that the players’ claims were preempted by the
arbitration clauses in the players’ collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”),
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, In Re: Nat’l Football, at 6, 7, 15. No. 2:12-md02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), and up until the settlement made little effort
to set forth arguments countering the players’ claims due to this CBA argument.
See id. at 14-34. The validity of this preemption argument would have been crucial
had the case not settled because if all of these claims were preempted by the CBAs
the players will be forced to pursue their case through the “agreed-to arbitration
19
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occurred while playing professional football in the NFL,25 and difficulty
proving that they did not expect their injuries.26
In a proactive response, many of the NFL’s insurers filed motions
for declaratory judgment in which they asked a court to determine whether
they had a duty to defend and/or indemnify the NFL. For example, Alterra
America Insurance Company (“Alterra”), one of the NFL’s insurers, filed a
complaint seeking a declaration of relief with respect to both its duty to
defend and its duty to indemnify the NFL against ninety-three different
lawsuits brought by former players.27 Alterra contended that since the
underlying claims filed by the players alleged that the NFL acted

procedures” in the CBAs. Paul D. Anderson, The Almighty CBA, NFL
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/ ?p=1080.
This defense will also be available to the NHL in its upcoming class action.
Anderson, supra note 7.
25
Due to the pressure that players feel, fewer concussions are reported because
players try to exude toughness and feign feeling healthy. Michael Farber, The
ILLUSTRATED
(Dec.
19,
1994),
Worst
Case,
SPORTS
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006087/index/index/
htm. While many players deny having symptoms when playing, the plaintiffs still
blamed the NFL for these attitudes and alleged that the NFL promotes football by
glorifying the brutality of the sport and representing that “putting big hits on others
is a badge of courage and does not seriously threaten one’s health.” Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 11. The plaintiffs’ complaint further asserts
that the League professed to its players that collisions, regardless of the injuries
they lead to, are a normal consequence of football and “a measure of the courage
and heroism of players.” Id. Due to these factors, it can certainly be argued that
players intended and/or expected these injuries.
26
Players would have trouble arguing that they did not intend and/or expect
their injuries when players such as Al Toon, a former wide receiver for the New
York Jets, who retired from football at age twenty-nine after sustaining his ninth
diagnosed concussion stated that “[he] chose the profession and [he] understood
the perils of the profession when [he] was playing.” William C. Rhoden, Two ExJets Have Moved On, but Concussion Effects Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/sports/football/concussion-effects-linger-fortwo-ex-jets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
supra note 22, at 13 (Ernest Givens stated, “I get knocked out a lot, I get
concussions, I get broken noses, that is part of being a receiver, that’s what
separates you from being a typical receiver than a great receiver.”)
27
Alterra Balks at Defending NFL in Concussion Suits, INSURANCE
JOURNAL.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/
2012/08/16/259710.htm.
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fraudulently, it should not be required to defend the League against the
players’ lawsuits.28 Soon after Alterra filed its motion for declaratory relief,
other insurers, including Travelers and Allstate, filed similar pleadings.29
Allstate also sought declaratory relief in relation to any alleged duty to
indemnify, claiming that “any past or future duty to indemnify the NFL
Defendants may be limited or precluded by a number of factual or legal
defenses.”30
After these insurers filed declaratory relief motions in New York,
the NFL brought a declaratory relief action in Los Angeles Superior Court
regarding the coverage duties of thirty-two insurance carriers pursuant to
187 commercial liability policies that were issued over a fifty to sixty year
period.31 The NFL then moved to dismiss the New York lawsuits, which
the defendant insurers argued against on forum non conveniens grounds.32
The Los Angeles Superior Court ordered the California proceeding stayed
pending the outcome of the New York actions and, despite the NFL’s
appeal, this decision was affirmed.33 As such, the declaratory relief motions
are ripe for decision in the Supreme Court of New York.
28

Id.
Consolidated Reply of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL Props.,
LLC in Support of Motions to Dismiss Claims of TIG Insurers, Travelers Insurers,
and Allstate, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co., et al. v. Nat’l Football League, et al., No.
652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 2012) at 2. Discover Property & Casualty
Insurance Company has filed a motion to dismiss or stay on forum non conveniens
grounds suggesting that California is an inconvenient and improper forum. See id.
at 1.
30
Answer of Defendant Allstate Ins. Co. and Crossclaim for Declaratory
Judgment against Defendants Nat’l Football League and Nat’l Football League
Props., LLC, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co., et al. v. National Football League, et al.,
14, No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012). In its cross claim, Allstate
alleges twenty-five factors that may limit or preclude its duty to indemnify
including that Allstate’s policies do not provide coverage for claims that arise from
conduct that is in violation of the law or public policy, the policies do not cover
bodily injury which did not take place during the policy period, and the excess
insurance policy does not provide coverage for any bodily injury or damage that
was expected or intended. See id. at 14-15.
31
Nat’l Football League et al., v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., No. B245619,
216 Cal. App. 4th 902, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2013).
32
See Consolidated Reply of Defendants, supra note 29, at 25-26; Discover
Prop. & Cas. Co. et al., supra note 29.
33
Mem. of Law of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL Props. LLC in
Support of Motion to Dismiss or Stay Discover Complaint and Counterclaims and
29
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As Allstate’s cross-claim illustrates, the insurers’ claims are
predicated on the merits of the underlying case between the NFL and its
players.34 At the time of this writing, these declaratory relief motions have
yet to be decided. However, due to the fact that the court would be
required to analyze the underlying claims of the players’ lawsuit against the
NFL in order to decide these motions, the Supreme Court of New York
should refrain from granting the insurers’ request for declaratory relief in
order to allow the issues to be decided by the proper fact-finders, the jury.
If the courts do deny the insurers’ motions for declaratory relief, the
insurers would likely be required to defend the NFL. Nevertheless, if this
case settles and no players choose to opt out of the settlement, these
motions become wholly irrelevant.
While there is a strong likelihood that the insurers would have a
duty to defend, it is just as likely that they would not be required to
indemnify the NFL. The NFL’s insurers possess several potential
arguments that can nullify their duty to indemnify the NFL. In the event
that this case proceeds to trial or players choose to opt out of a settlement
and continue to sue the NFL, the NFL’s insurers could argue that the NFL
intended and/or expected these injuries. The NFL conducted studies of
concussions in professional football spanning from 1994 to 2005,
examining periods during the 1990s and 2000s.35 One of the most
significant NFL studies was conducted in 199436 and was set in motion by
then Commissioner of Football, Paul Tagliabue, who formed the Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (“Committee”).37 The Committee’s goal
was to study concussions (also referred to as mild traumatic brain injuries
Cross-Claims of TIG Insurers and Allstate at 11-12, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co. et
al. v. Nat’l Football League et al., No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2012).
34
Allstate is claiming it does not owe a duty to defend based on the potential
of intended and/or expected injury and arguments that injuries did not occur within
the policy period which would go to the heart of the trigger issues of the
underlying case. See Answer of Defendant Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 30, at 15.
35
See, e.g., Nathan Fenno & Luke Rosiak, NFL Concussion Lawsuits, WASH.
TIMES (July 19, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/football injuries/.
36
The concussion problem was a rampant issue as early as 1994. In that year,
data supplied by twenty-eight NFL teams demonstrated that from 1989 to 1993,
341 players on the twenty-eight teams in the League had suffered from 445
concussions. Farber, supra note 25. This equated to about two and a half
concussions for every 1,000 plays. Id.
37
Paul Anderson, A New Era of Pro Football, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Oct.
17, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1194.
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or MTBIs), in professional football and to determine their potential longterm effects.38
After fifteen years, the Committee released several studies that are
now all considered extremely controversial.39 One of these studies,
“Concussion in Professional Football: Summary of the Research
Conducted by the National Football League’s Committee of Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury,” refuted the link between concussions and
neurodegenerative diseases.40 The study noted that “arbitrary return-to-play
guidelines may be too conservative for professional football . . . [and] many
NFL players can safely be allowed to return to play on the day of the injury
after sustaining a [M]TBI.”41
Based on this and other evidence, the insurers could argue, similar
to what the players alleged in their complaint, that the NFL intentionally
misled the players about the potential consequences of concussions. If
proven, this would bar the NFL from coverage under its CGL policies. The
insurers could successfully argue that during the fifteen-year period when
the Committee was conducting studies, the NFL concealed and/or
misrepresented the long-term effects of concussions from its players and
knew that its studies were misleading.42 The argument that the NFL
concealed information, was explored in the October 2009 and January 2010
Judiciary hearings before the House of Representatives. The Committee on
the Judiciary (the “Judiciary”) held a hearing to determine the severity of
the concussion problem in football and the potential remedies that were
available.43
At these hearings, the NFL was questioned about a pamphlet
dealing with concussions, which it distributed to its players. The pamphlet
stated:

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. (discussing Elliot J. Pellman & David C. Viano, Concussion in
Professional Football: Summary of the Research Conducted by the National
Football League’s Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 21
NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS (2006)).
41
Id.
42
See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, supra note
22, at 33.
43
See Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Pt. I): Hearing Before
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. John
Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
39
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Question: if I have had more than one concussion, am I at
increased risks for another injury? Answer: Current
research with professional athletes has not shown that
having more than one or two concussions leads to
permanent problems if each injury is managed properly. It
is important to understand that there is no magic number
for how many concussions is too many.44
Thus, the NFL was informing its players that there is “no magic number”
of concussions that makes a player more prone to suffer long-term
neurological damage at the same time when numerous studies showed a
link between any blunt force trauma, such as that occurring in football, and
premature death among athletes. This type of questionable behavior lends
support to the players’ allegations that the NFL concealed information from
them.45 Similarly, during these Judiciary hearings, the NFL Commissioner,
Roger Goodell, would not unequivocally agree that there was proof of a
link between concussions and neurodegenerative diseases.46 One Judiciary
member referred to the League’s denial as a blank rejection and accused
the League of minimizing the fact that this link existed.47
If the NFL concussion litigation does not settle, or some players
opt out of the settlement and continue to sue the NFL, courts would be
required to analyze these and other defenses to coverage for nearly 200
CGL policies due to the fact that from 1968 to 2012 the NFL was covered
by insurance policies issued by thirty-two insurance carriers.48
Nevertheless, this analysis has yet to occur, as two years after the first
players filed their lawsuits against the NFL, the NFL entered into a
preliminary settlement with the players for $765 million. From this
settlement amount, $675 million will

44

Id. at 115-16.
See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-form Complaint, supra note
22, at 1.
46
See Legal issues relating to football head injuries. Pt. I, supra note 43, at
116-18 (2009) (statement of Comm’r of Football, Roger Goodell, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
47
Id. at 116. (statement of Representative John Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (statement of California Representative Linda T. Sanchez).
48
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 906.
45
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[c]ompensate former players and families of deceased
players who have suffered cognitive injury . . . . Other
money will be used for baseline medical exams, the cost of
which will be capped at $75 million. The NFL also will
fund research and education at a cost of $10 million . . . .
The settlement will include all players (whether they were
part of the suit or not) who have retired as of the date on
which the court gives preliminary approval . . . . Current
players are not eligible. The NFL has [twenty] years to
pay the full amount of the settlement, but half of the total
must be paid within the first three years and the rest over
the next [seventeen] years.49
According to ESPN, the compensation program is designed to last for up to
sixty years and will allow retired players who later develop neurological
diseases or conditions to apply for compensation.50
While it appeared as though the NFL concussion litigation was
concluding, the judge handling this litigation denied preliminary approval
of the settlement, explaining that, “I’m primarily concerned that not
all Retired NFL Football Players who ultimately receive a Qualifying
Diagnosis or their related claimants will be paid.”51 This judge commended
both sides for arriving at this preliminary settlement,52 but explained that
she was not convinced that the settlement “ha[d] no obvious deficiencies,
grant[ed] no preferential treatment to segments of the class, and [fell]
within the range of possible approval.”53 The NFL will likely still arrive at
a settlement with its players; however, one attorney explained that he
believes that the current settlement does not adequately compensate many
of the players and indicated that even if the settlement is approved by the
judge, many players may “opt out” of the settlement and continue litigation
against the NFL.54
49

Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2.
Id.
51
Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
supra note 3.
52
Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2.
53
Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
supra note 3 (citing Cordy v. USS-Posco Indus., No. 12-553, 2013 WL 4028627 at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2013).
54
Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 6.
50
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Thus, these settlement discussions and the litigation that may
follow are only the beginning of the conversation that will take place
nationwide about concussions in sports. In fact, in the past three years
since the initial lawsuits in the NFL concussion litigation were filed, a new
era of professional football has emerged in which players are informed
about the risks they face when they step onto the field.55 In this new era,
players no longer make their own medical determinations as to when they
obtain a head injury. Instead, independent neurologists decide when
concussed players can return to the game.56 This change has not been
limited to the NFL, however, and this leads to the question: how will the
numerous issues in the NFL concussion litigation be resolved if this case
does not settle? And, how will these questions be answered in the context
of the NHL concussion litigation? To evaluate the insurance issues that
will arise in the NFL concussion litigation if it proceeds and in the NHL
concussion litigation, this Note will focus on the upcoming NHL
concussion litigation.
III.

INSURANCE CONTRACT BACKGROUND IN NHL
CONCUSSION LITIGATION

One type of insurance policy that the NHL has is a CGL policy that
insures the League for injuries that players sustain as long as those injuries
are not excluded from coverage. Although the specific policies sold to the
NHL by its insurers are not available to the public, the typical CGL
policy’s terms and provisions will be similar to the clauses of the NHL’s
CGL insurance policies which the courts will be required to analyze.57 Like
the NFL did, when the NHL defends the newly formed player-led class
action, it will likely turn to its insurers for indemnification relying on its
“insuring clause” within its CGL policy.58 A typical insuring clause
55

See Anderson, supra note 37.
Id.
57
The insurance contracts will only be analyzed if these cases are not subject
to mandatory arbitration. The League will argue that the players’ claims are subject
to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the players’ collective bargaining agreements.
See Anderson, supra note 7.
58
See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 908; Appellants’
Brief, Nat’l Football League & NFL Props. LLC, v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., et
al., 2013 WL 233176 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.) at 1-2 (internal citations omitted) (The
NFL and NFL Properties filed an action in California against thirty-two general
liability insurers that issued 187 primary and excess insurance policies to one or
56
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provides that the insurer “will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage to which [the] insurance applies.”59 The
NHL’s general liability insurers are likely as extensive as the NFL’s
insurers in number60 and as such, these lawsuits coupled with those ongoing in the NFL, will undoubtedly affect how insurers choose to insure
any contact sport organization in the future.
In the NHL, this discussion regarding how to cover the League in
this concussion era may have already begun in the context of disability
insurance. For instance, in 2012, one of the Pittsburgh Penguins’ top
players, Sidney Crosby, was sidelined for most of the season due to
concussion-related injuries.61 Since Crosby had been injured and out of the
lineup for more than thirty games, the Penguins relied on their disability
insurance policy to cover Crosby’s nine million dollar salary. Analysts
have suggested, however, that this “security blanket is poised to
disappear”62 because insurance companies may cease to insure these
athletes, forcing teams to take on these million-dollar contracts alone.63 For
the Penguins, this is especially troubling because if Crosby, who has one
year remaining on his contract, returns to the ice, he will be in line for a
new long-term contract for approximately ten million dollars a year. But if
no insurance company is willing to insure him against concussions, the
Penguins may not be able to afford to retain him.64
The chief executive of one New York-based insurer, HCC
Specialty, noted that “[r]ight now you’ve got [ten] percent of the [L]eague
both over a forty-four year period. “The NFL Policyholders sued twelve primary
insurers for breach of their duty to defend the NFL Policyholders in underlying tort
litigation filed by former NFL players, and sued all 32 insurers for a declaratory
judgment that their policies cover any liability that might be incurred in the tort
litigation.”)
59
TODD A. ROSSI & MARK D. MESE, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 109 (Alan Rutkin & Robert
Tugander eds., 2010); See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 358 (2008).
60
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 906.
61
See Rick Westhead, Concussions Could Ruin NHL Teams If Insurers Pull
(Jan.
30,
2012),
Coverage,
THESTAR.COM
http://www.thestar.com/sports/hockey/2012/01/30/ concussions_could_ruin_nhl
_teams_if_insurers_pull_coverage.html.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See id.
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affected by concussions . . . [w]hile I don’t know where the breaking point
is, at some point, if it keeps trending this way, [insurance] companies are
not going to be able to insure NHL players for concussions.”65 Another
insurer, Toronto-based Sutton Special Risk, an insurer for “off-ice
insurance to more than 400 NHL players,” rewrote its insurance application
form in order to focus more attention on players’ concussion histories and
help protect itself from liability for players with past concussions.66
Due to the vast number of players who have been sidelined with
concussions in the NHL, there is no question that this is one of the most
prevalent issues in the League today. Despite the magnitude of the
concussion problem in the NHL, the president of Sutton Special Risk
professed that it is too early to say that the insurance industry will change
the policies that it offers to NHL players because the industry is still
evolving.67 With that said, it is likely a matter of time before this discussion
of limiting or revoking the League’s insurance for players with concussions
transcends the context of disability insurance to that of general liability
insurance. Insurers will need to make difficult decisions to protect
themselves from this concussion epidemic that will remain at the forefront
of contact sports for the foreseeable future. While insurers may decide to
take steps to limit their liability through modifying the policies that they
offer to their contact sport insureds, insurers will still stand behind their
current policies in the upcoming NHL litigation and likely argue that even
under their current policies they do not have a duty to defend or indemnify
the League.

65

Id.
See id. (Sutton Special Risk’s president noted, “[w]e used to have one
question asking players their history with cardiac issues and other problems like
concussions . . . [n]ow, concussions have their own section. We’re asking about
frequency, how bad they were and how many games they missed. We know you’re
not recovered from brain injuries because the symptoms go away. This is not an
organ like the liver that can regenerate itself.”).
67
See NHL concussions put player insurance in question, CBC SPORTS (Jan.
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/nhl/nhl-concussions-put-player31,
2012),
insurance-in-question-1.1132073. But see Westhead, supra note 61 (according to
one player agent, new contracts will contain concussion exclusions, making it
impossible for teams to insure players with past concussions against future brain
injuries).
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A. NHL CONCUSSION LITIGATION
In the NHL class action complaint, the players are alleging
numerous counts, including fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment,
fraudulent misrepresentation by nondisclosure, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and negligence.68 The players’ claims rest on the
growing body of medical evidence linking concussions to long-term injury
as well as on evidence that the League knew or should have known of those
medical studies but took no remedial action to prevent injury until 1997.69
The players note that in 1997 the NHL created a concussion program to
conduct research about the effects of concussions on players’ brains.
Despite conducting that research, the players allege that the NHL did
nothing to actually prevent injury to its players for another fourteen years.70
Additionally, the players assert that the NHL continues to ignore the
extensive medical research linking hockey to brain injuries and fosters
violence in the sport by, among other things, “refusing to ban fighting and
body checking and by continuing to employ hockey players whose main
function is to fight or violently body check players on the other team.”71
Observing that the NHL has an annual gross income of $3.3 billion,72 the
players argue that the NHL has promoted a culture of violence and
“purposefully profits from the violence they promote.”73
The players contend that the NHL did not make any significant
changes to prevent concussions until 2010 when it made body checking
with the head a penalty.74 After 2010, the NHL made other noteworthy
safety changes including requiring a doctor, as opposed to a trainer, to
examine its players for concussions off the ice and away from the bench75
and changing its concussion protocols to forbid any concussed player from
68

See, e.g., Compl., supra note 9, at 36–46.
See id. at ¶ 7.
70
See id. at ¶ 11.
71
Id. at ¶ 17; see also id. at ¶ 133 (not outlawing fighting and body checks in
the NHL is significant because “[o]nly [twenty eight percent] of the reported
concussions in the Cusimano report were the result of a called penalty while
[approximately sixty four percent] of the total concussions were caused by body
checking. A legal body check to the other player’s body can still result in the
checked player’s head hitting the ice, boards or glass, resulting in a concussion.”).
72
Id. at ¶ 78.
73
Id. at ¶ 89.
74
Id. at ¶ 112.
75
Id. at ¶ 116.
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returning to the game in which they received the concussion.76 Similar to
the allegations in the NFL concussion litigation, the NHL players’ overall
argument is that “[t]he NHL knew that repetitive head impacts in hockey
games and practices created an unreasonable risk of harm to NHL players77
. . . [but] withheld [and/or concealed] the information it knew about the
risks of head injuries in the game from then-current NHL players and
former NHL players.”78 Moreover, the players allege in their complaint that
the NHL “deliberately delayed implementing the changes to the game it
knew could reduce players’ exposure to the risk of life-altering head
injuries because those changes would be expensive and would reduce its
profitability.”79
Overall, the NHL players’ allegations are very similar to those
made by the NFL players in their class action lawsuit.80 For that reason, it
is likely the League’s insurers will react in a similar way to how the NFL’s
insurers have acted thus far. Yet, even if the NHL and NFL cases both do
not proceed to trial, these two concussion litigation class action lawsuits
will motivate insurers to protect themselves from future concussion
lawsuits. Hence, regardless of the results of these litigations, insurers must
confront the fact that under their current CGL policies, they are possibly
responsible for at least defending, and also potentially indemnifying, their
insured in the event of a lawsuit based on concussions and related longterm injuries.
Due to their likely liability, insurers may take steps to make it clear
in their policies what the trigger is in the event of a concussion. If insurers
do attempt to alter their policies, it is possible that they could face push
back from individual state insurance regulators, depending on the state.
However, because the NHL and NFL are both such large entities, it is
possible they will not be required to obtain permission to alter their CGL
76

See id. at ¶ 118 (a standard that other countries adopted in 2004).
Id. at ¶ 170.
78
See id. at ¶¶ 177, 200.
79
Id. at ¶ 201.
80
But see Anderson, Concussion Litigation Strikes the NHL, supra note 7
(“Although the legal theories are similar [between the NFL and NHL concussion
litigation], the factual allegations in the NHL litigation are far less damning than
those asserted against NFL. There is no evidence — at least publicly — that shows
the NHL created (1) a brain injury committee, (2) headed by a rheumatologist and
(3) spent 15-plus years creating false studies.”). Additionally, unlike the NFL, the
NHL was not questioned for their actions in relations to concussions in their league
by Congress and have not denied that their sport can cause brain damage. Id.
77
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policies. Additionally, insurers must contemplate how their exclusions for
intended and/or expected injuries may assist them in avoiding
indemnification and their duty to defend in any continuing litigation.
IV.

OPEN QUESTIONS AFTER THE NFL CONCUSSION
LITIGATION
A. TRIGGERS AND OCCURRENCES

An insurance policy comes into effect or is triggered when a relevant
condition of the policy has occurred; at that time, the insurers’ obligations
become due.81 In many insurance cases, the “trigger” of coverage is not at
issue.82 When the cause or the injury itself does not occur at a discrete
moment, however, and instead materializes over time, it can be difficult to
determine what policies were triggered and exactly when they were
triggered.83
The conditions that trigger an insurance policy are called
occurrences. An “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including
injurious exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured.”84 A typical CGL policy states that the bodily
injury or property damage must be caused by an occurrence that takes place
during the policy period.85 In either sport, it is undisputed that the affected
NFL and NHL players sustained bodily injuries, which are defined as
“bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person.”86 The bodily
injuries at issue are the neurodegenerative disorders and diseases that the
plaintiffs sustained due, at least in part, to repeated head traumas while
playing NFL football and NHL hockey.
In cases such as these, where harm accrued over a long period of
time, coverage will turn on the presence of a trigger. However, the
standard CGL policy does not clearly specify which trigger theory is
applicable. This is the difficulty with latent harms, or “harms that may not

81

ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 109.
See id.
83
See BAKER, supra note 59, at 375.
84
ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 110.
85
See BAKER, supra note 59, at 358.
86
Id. at 369.
82
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develop into symptomatic diseases for significant periods of time.”87 With
latent harms, a player is injured, but the injury does not immediately
manifest itself. In these instances, a player is arguably injured once they
receive a concussion, as their brain may begin to develop a
neurodegenerative disease, but these neurodegenerative diseases do not
manifest themselves for many years. Thus, in cases presenting latent
harms, a court must decide what type of trigger theory to impose.
B. TRIGGER THEORIES
Courts typically apply one of three main trigger theories to
determine when an insurance contract is triggered: the initial exposure
trigger theory, the manifestation trigger theory, or the continuous trigger
theory. In the case of latent harms, courts are forced to consider the
difficulty of determining the point at which an insured became injured.
Courts were faced with similar questions in the asbestos context and
considered the unworkability of the initial exposure and manifestation
trigger theories and the insured’s reasonable expectations. Inhaling
asbestos is a type of latent harm because a person who inhales asbestos
does not appear ill until a long period of time after exposure, when they
begin to exhibit symptoms. While an injured person is not aware that they
have been exposed to asbestos, they are still ill from the moment of their
initial exposure to the asbestos through the point in time when they exhibit
signs of diseases such as mesothelioma.
Consequently, in dealing with asbestos cases, these courts
employed a continuous trigger theory, finding that the manifestation trigger
theory and the initial exposure trigger theory, which both utilize a discrete
moment to trigger insurance policies, were too difficult to apply due to
issues of proof regarding the timing of the injuries. While both the
manifestation and initial exposure trigger theories were implemented in
earlier asbestos cases, more recent cases have applied a trigger theory more
akin to the continuous trigger theory.88

87

Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1505,
1506 (1998).
88
See, e.g., J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506
(Pa. 1993); AC & S, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir.
1985); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
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If the NFL and NHL concussion cases proceed to trial, one of the
most difficult insurance coverage issues will be determining when the
players’ injuries actually occurred. Some of the plaintiffs’ neurological
injuries may have begun before they started playing professional football or
professional hockey.89 There is no feasible way to differentiate which
injuries were exacerbated by playing in the NHL or NFL from those which
occurred for the first time while playing in the NHL or NFL. Accordingly,
it would be nearly impossible to use either an initial exposure theory or a
manifestation theory to trigger the insurance policies.
Additionally, neither of these theories would protect the reasonable
expectations of the insured, the NHL. “Under the ‘doctrine of reasonable
expectations,’ an insured is entitled to all the coverage he may reasonably
expect to be provided according to the terms of the policy.”90 Only “an
unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the [insurer’s]
intent to exclude coverage will defeat that expectation.”91 In asbestos cases,
courts recognized that attempting to confine an injury in cases of latent
harm to one discrete moment would undercut the purpose of the insured’s
policy and ignore the reasonable expectations of the insured.92 This is due
to the fact that insureds purchase policies so that they can be covered for
injuries that occur during the policy period. This expectation of coverage is
not altered in instances of latent harm where injuries do not occur at finite
moments. Thus, if either an initial exposure theory, which covers the
injury if the insured is exposed to the cause during the policy period, or a
manifestation theory, which covers the injury if it manifests itself during
the policy period, is utilized, the insurer would be excused from covering
the vast majority of the latent harm.

89

Stuart Dean, Concussion: A Word Not Easily Defined and Why that Spells
Trouble for Football, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1200.
90
Ky. Ass'n of Counties All Lines Fund Trust v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626,
634 (Ky. 2005). The reasonable expectations doctrine “calls for an ascertainment
of the insured's expectations, followed by a necessarily subjective determination of
whether that expectation is reasonable.” 2 Couch on Ins. § 22:11.
91
McClendon, 157 S.W.3d at 634.
92
See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045.
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1. Initial Exposure Trigger Theory
The initial exposure trigger theory utilizes the date when the
insured was first exposed to the harm that caused them to have a bodily
injury to trigger an insurance policy.93 The Sixth Circuit implemented this
exposure theory in a 1980 asbestos case due to its conclusion that bodily
injury from asbestos began with the first exposure to and inhalation of
asbestos.94 While the injury of neurodegenerative diseases can and often
does begin with the initial exposure to MTBIs, it would be difficult to
pinpoint a precise time as the “initial exposure” because if players did not
exhibit symptoms of a concussion, no official diagnostic medical test was
conducted when a player was hit.95 Additionally, since there are numerous
symptoms of concussions,96 and these symptoms can be subtle, concussions
are often misdiagnosed or entirely undiagnosed.97
In view of these problems of proof, there are two major difficulties
in ascertaining the timing of a player’s injury. First, it would be extremely
difficult to determine when players received their first concussion or any
concussion at all, especially in the case of veteran players who played at a
time when even less was known about concussions. Second, it would be
nearly impossible to conclude that a player who sustained a concussion was
in the early stages of developing a neurodegenerative disorder. In fact, all
of the hockey and football players who died or committed suicide and were
found to be suffering from CTE were not diagnosed until death because, at
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ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 116.
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th
Cir. 1980).
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See Ira R. Casson et al., Concussion in the National Football League: An
Overview for Neurologists, 26 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 217, 217 (2008); Dan Rosen,
New concussion protocol goes into effect tonight, NHL.COM (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=556289 (discussing NHL practices prior to
protocol change in 2011 for concussion testing after injury).
96
Symptoms are either (1) somatic, including headaches, dizziness, balance
problems, and nausea, (2) cognitive, including memory, concentration and
processing speed problems, or (3) affective including anxiety and depression.
Suzanne Leclerc et al., Recommendations for Grading of Concussion in Athletes,
31 SPORTS MED. 629, 634 (2001).
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the time of this writing, CTE can only be diagnosed post mortem.98 Due to
this inability to determine the “initial exposure,” an initial exposure trigger
theory is not well suited to concussion litigation.
Additionally, the initial exposure trigger theory does not comport
with the insured’s reasonable expectations. In Keene, the court analyzed
the appropriate trigger of coverage for the latent harm of asbestos.99 The
court noted that if exposure was deemed to be a discrete injury that
triggered coverage,
[T]he subsequent development of a disease would be
characterized best as a consequence of the injury. Future
stages of development would not constitute new injuries
and therefore would not trigger additional coverage.
Under that interpretation, a manufacturer who bought a
comprehensive general liability policy would not bear the
risk of liability for diseases that occurred due to exposure
during a covered period. It would, however, bear the risk
of liability for diseases that manifest themselves during the
covered period, but that occur because of exposure at a
time when the manufacturer held no insurance. As a result,
the manufacturer's purchase of insurance would not
constitute a purchase of certainty with respect to liability
for asbestos-related diseases. The insured would remain
uncertain as to future liability for injuries whose
development began prior to the purchase of insurance . . .
such an exclusion is inconsistent with [the insured’s]
reasonable expectations when it purchased the policies.100
This same analysis is applicable in this latent harm context. Insureds
purchase insurance to obtain certainty that they will be covered for liability.
Practically speaking, however, the insurers who issued policies to the
League when its players were first exposed to MTBIs are different from the
insurers who insured it decades later when the players’ injuries manifested
themselves as neurological disorders. Thus, the problem with using an
98

See Gary W. Small et al., PET Scanning of Brain Tau in Retired National
Football League Players: Preliminary Findings, 21 AM. J. GERIATRIC.
PSYCHIATRY 138, 139 (2013).
99
Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042.
100
Id. at 1044.
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initial exposure theory in this context is that an insured, here the League,
reasonably expects that if it were liable for damages, such as now when it is
being sued by past players, that it would be covered. However, the League
would not be covered or would be covered for only a fraction of the time
because the players’ injuries had been developing for years after the initial
exposure.
Due to the latency of the injuries, however, the analysis for
determining the trigger of coverage cannot commence until the point of
manifestation. Therefore, precisely when the League would expect
players’ injuries to be covered by the League’s insurance policies, when the
injuries became apparent, the League would not be covered. Because this
would not conform with the NHL’s reasonable expectations, the initial
exposure trigger theory should not be applied to this litigation.
2. Manifestation Trigger Theory
Under the manifestation trigger theory, insurance coverage is
triggered when the damage or injury manifests itself or becomes
apparent.101 In a 1982 asbestos case, the First Circuit adopted a
manifestation theory on grounds that an injury is not diagnosed or felt until
it becomes evident.102
Over time, however, the limitations of the manifestation trigger
theory have become apparent. A manifestation trigger theory would be
exceptionally difficult to implement in the concussion context. In these
concussion cases it is difficult to pinpoint at what time the players’
neurodegenerative diseases became apparent. For instance, was it when a
player obtained a concussion and felt dizzy, when a player could not
remember the name of his children, or somewhere in between these two
moments? In this type of litigation, where thousands of players’ careers are
involved, making the determination of when players’ injuries manifested
would be unworkable. In fact, “[c]ourts in recent years have been moving
away from the manifestation trigger because of the difficulty in
determining what constitutes manifestation of an injury concluding that this
trigger theory is ‘inherently unworkable.’”103
101
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Additionally, limiting the trigger to the one finite moment of
manifestation does not fully protect the reasonable expectations of the
insured. If manifestation was the sole trigger of coverage, then the
insurance companies would only bear a fraction of the insured’s total
liability due to the fact that harm was occurring long before
manifestation.104 That result would “undermine the function of the
insurance policies” because when an insured purchases policies, the insured
could reasonably expect to be free of the risk of being liable for injuries
that “it could not have been aware prior to its purchase of insurance.”105 If
the disease manifested soon after a player sustained a MTBI, these losses
would be covered and the insurer would compensate the insured. However,
in the case of neurodegenerative diseases that are caused by earlier
concussions, insurers would not be liable due to the fact that a long period
of time exists between exposure and manifestation.106
Therefore, “to accept the argument that only manifestation triggers
coverage — and allow insurers to terminate coverage prior to the
manifestation of many cases of disease — would deprive [the insured] of
the protection it purchased when it entered into the insurance contracts.”107
In the latent harm context, the insured purchased a policy believing an
injury that occurred during the policy period would be covered and not
expecting that only injuries that occurred and manifested themselves during
the policy period would be covered. As one court explained in the asbestos
context:
The fact that a doctor would characterize cellular damage
as a discrete injury does not necessarily imply that the
damage is an ‘injury’ for the purpose of construing the
policies. At the same time, the fact that an ordinary person
would characterize a fully developed disease as an ‘injury’
does not necessarily imply that the manifestation of the
disease is the point of ‘injury’ for purposes of construing
the policies.108
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This same logic applies in the concussion context: while a doctor may
consider a concussion a discrete injury, that does not necessarily imply that
the damage of a concussion is an “injury” for purposes of construing an
insurance policy. At the same time, the fact that an ordinary person would
characterize a fully developed neurological disease as an “injury” does not
necessarily imply that the manifestation of the disease is the point of
“injury” for purposes of construing the policies.
In the context of concussion litigation, like “the context of
asbestos-related disease[s], the term[] ‘bodily injury,’ . . . standing alone,
simply lack[s] the precision necessary to identify a point in the
development of a disease at which coverage is triggered.”109 Due to the fact
that the general terms of an insurance policy in the latent harm context lack
precision, courts are left to rely on the practicality of implementing a
trigger theory and determining if that theory comports with the reasonable
expectations of the insured. In this context, utilizing the manifestation
theory would prove to be unworkable due to the difficulty in ascertaining
when the injury is manifested. In order to determine the trigger in the NHL
litigation, courts must ask whether the players suffered MTBIs while they
were playing in the NHL and if the head traumas that occurred during their
professional careers caused the neurological damage complained of, as
opposed to other head impacts the players sustained in earlier or later time
periods. At first glance, this may seem simple to ascertain. However, these
players have been playing competitive hockey for years, throughout
childhood into middle school and high school and through college all prior
to entering the NHL. Consequently, both the initial exposure theory and
the manifestation theories are unworkable.
3. Continuous Trigger Theory
More recent CGL policies define an occurrence as “an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions.”110 Policies employing this “occurrence”
definition embrace a continuous trigger theory, which entails providing
coverage from the date of the initial exposure to the date when the injury
manifests itself.111
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Keene, 667 F.2d at 1043.
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This theory was formulated because courts concluded that an
insured should not be without coverage when they reasonably expected that
they would be covered.112 In the asbestos context, the continuous trigger
theory has gained widespread acceptance.113 In fact, in Keene, even when
the insurance policy at issue did not utilize continuous trigger language, the
D.C. Circuit found that while
The policy language [did] not direct [it] unambiguously to
either the ‘exposure’ or ‘manifestation’ interpretation, [i]n
the context of asbestos-related disease[s], the terms ‘bodily
injury,’ ‘sickness’ and ‘disease,’ standing alone, simply
lack the precision necessary to identify a point in the
development of a disease at which coverage is triggered . .
. . In interpreting a contract, a term’s ordinary definition
should be given weight, but the definition is only useful
when viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.114
Thus, courts in the asbestos context now have guidance from language in
insurance policies that use the term “continuous,” and when there is no
such language, courts examine the context of the contract as a whole. In
other words, while newer insurance policies, which utilize continuous
language in defining an occurrence, provide clearer guidance that a
continuous trigger theory is appropriate, under older policies the NHL can
still rely on its reasonable expectations because the term “injury” does not
clearly guide courts to adopt either a manifestation or initial exposure
trigger theory.
Another reason courts utilize the continuous trigger theory in the
asbestos context is that it is supported by medical research. Medical
research has revealed “that bodily injury occurs during the exposure period
. . . [and] it continues to occur past the point of manifestation . . . until the
112

See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1044.
Rogers, supra note 103 (citing Robert D. Fram, End Game: Trigger of
Coverage in the Third Decade of CGL Latent Injury Litigation, 454 PRACTISING
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claimant's death.”115 Asbestos inhalation is a latent harm under the same
rationale that concussions are a latent harm — a person who breathes in
asbestos but does not become ill for a long period of time is similar to the
plaintiffs in this litigation who were exposed to MTBIs and were thus in the
preliminary stages of neurological disease, but did not know they were
injured until symptoms of neurological damage manifested at a much later
time. Thus, in both cases, a continuous trigger theory provides the greatest
possible redress for the victims and for the League.116
Moreover, a continuous trigger better suits the NHL concussion
litigation because it best addresses the problems of proof, which make the
manifestation and exposure theories unworkable. Again, it is nearly
impossible to determine when someone is injured due to the latent nature of
this harm. These proof problems and the inability of both the manifestation
and initial exposure trigger theories to fully cover the plaintiffs’ reasonable
expectations make the continuous trigger theory the best approach for
deciding when the NHL’s insurance policies are triggered.
While it would be more beneficial for insurers to control what
trigger theory courts implement by adding language into their policies, a
continuous trigger theory does have one advantage for insurers. Courts
have determined that the term “occurrence” suggests that the policy was
intended to cover more than a single accident, and instead, covers
continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harm.117 Typically,
insurance policies will contain a provision that explains that continuous
exposure to the same harm is one occurrence so that the insurer will only
be liable for their policy limits for a single occurrence.118 This approach
benefits the insurers because consolidating all the individual injuries as one
“occurrence” would, to some extent, diminish the insurers’ liability to its
insured. This single occurrence policy limit factor, however, would be a
silver lining to a very dark cloud, as judges will likely invoke the
continuous trigger theory as the most workable standard limiting insurers’
ability to avoid coverage.
Insurers in the NHL and other contact sports are likely to take
additional steps in the near future to protect themselves so that they are not
liable for the entire span of a player’s career when a player develops a
115
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neurodegenerative disease from their contact sport career. Insurers have a
few options for how to protect themselves. For instance, when insurers
issue replacement policies for older policies that have expired, they may be
able to change the trigger of coverage or the scope of coverage itself.
As briefly noted above, one option would be to define the trigger of
coverage as the first diagnosed concussion or the first diagnosis of a
neurological disorder in their insurance policies to avoid leaving the
question of the trigger up to a judge. Additionally, insurers could add
concussion exclusions into their policies to avoid covering players with
histories of concussions. This may result in pushback from individual
NHL teams as well as the press and the public at large, however, if the
NHL’s insurers turn their backs on players who have been in the League
for a number of years. Another option that insurers have would be to put
pressure on the NHL to change its policies about fighting and other safety
measures in order to insure the League for concussion-related injuries.
This would likely reduce the number of concussions, as many of the NHL
players who had CTE in their brains were termed the “NHL enforcers,”119
players known for their aggressive fighting in the League. At a minimum,
insurers will likely expand their underwriting of concussions by asking
more thorough and extensive questions about a player’s concussion history
so they can properly assess and price the risk. While insurers could take an
even bigger step to protect themselves and stop insuring the NHL and its
players, since the NHL, a multi-billion dollar industry,120 is a real profit
center, it would be very difficult for insurers to walk away from it.
V.

EXPECTED AND/OR INTENDED INJURIES

Aside from alleging that its insurance policies were not triggered
due to a particular trigger theory, insurers can also argue that the League
expected and/or intended its players’ concussions. While the insurers could
raise this defense to coverage, they may find it difficult to persuade a court
that the League intended and/or expected that the players would have longterm neurological diseases. There is ample evidence that physical injuries
in contact sports are expected, but courts have yet to draw a parallel
between physical injuries, which are expected and/or intended, and
cognitive or neurological injuries.
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A. EXPECTED INJURIES ARE NOT “OCCURRENCES.”
In order for an event to be covered under a CGL insurance policy,
it must also take place by chance.121 If the policyholder has control over the
risk, the event may not be considered an “occurrence.”122 Under the typical
CGL policy, for “bodily injury” to be covered, it must occur during the
policy period and cannot, prior to the policy period, be known to have
occurred by any insured.123 Under this provision, if players knew they had
sustained MTBIs prior to entering the NHL, the insurer may not be liable.
The argument that the League expected and/or intended these
injuries may be difficult to sustain, however, because not all concussions
lead to neurodegenerative diseases. Additionally, not all players who
previously sustained concussions knew that they had been injured.
Moreover, the League was unlikely to have access to information about
players’ injuries prior to them entering the League.
Despite these obstacles, the insurers could still allege that the
League expected that the players might sustain long-term neurological
injuries due to the violent nature of the game of hockey. Under this theory,
the insurers could argue that they do not have a duty to indemnify the
League because CGL policies contain an exclusion for intended or
expected injury. This provision provides that, “‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” is
excluded from coverage.124 Expected injury typically requires that the
insured “knows or reasonably anticipates” that there is a high probability
that the insured’s conduct will cause harm.125 Therefore, the insurers may
be able to show that the NHL had knowledge about the risks that the
players were facing by playing professional hockey and thus knew, or at
least reasonably anticipated, that they were more prone to suffering from
long-term cognitive injuries.
Additionally, the League could be liable for failing to inform its
players of these health risks if the insurers can show that the League
possessed information about the seriousness of MTBIs and remained silent.
121
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Moreover, if the League engaged in intentional misconduct by fraudulently
concealing information, as the players allege, the League’s conduct could
be excluded from coverage.126
Thus, the question of what injury the League expected or intended is
central. Absent evidence to the contrary, it is likely that the League
expected that its players could sustain short-term physical injuries but not
long-term neurological harms. However, this distinction between the types
of injury that players would experience may not be enough to secure
coverage.127 The Evans test, which some courts utilize, requires that the
insured intended its conduct and intended some kind of injury, but once
these requirements have been met, it is “immaterial that the actual harm
caused is of a different character or magnitude from that intended” by the
insured.128 Under the Evans test, if the insurers proved that the League
intended or expected that the players would be injured, it would be
immaterial if the League intended or expected eventual neurological harm,
and therefore these claims would not be covered under the NHL’s
insurance policies.
Courts applying the Evans test rationalize its
implementation by explaining that this test is consistent with both parties’
reasonable expectations and is aligned with public policy.129 Thus, under
the Evans test, a court may find that the League expected or intended to act
in a way that would result in some type of injury to the players and
therefore its claims would be not covered by its insurance policies.
One notable difference about this argument in the NFL context is
that there is no condoned physical fighting in the NFL. As the hockey
players’ complaint alleges:
For decades, the NHL has been aware or should have been
aware that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term
brain injury, including but not limited to memory loss,
dementia, depression, and CTE and its related symptoms.
126
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Indeed, since the NHL has permitted bare-knuckle, on-ice
fighting from its inception to the present, the NHL knew or
should have known that the nearly century-old data from
boxing was particularly relevant to professional hockey.130
Boxing was one of the first sports to conduct research on the dangerous
impacts of multiple blows to the head.131 Due to that widely known
research, the insurers have a strong argument that the League intended
and/or expected the players’ injuries by allowing and supporting
fighting.132 From the prospective of the insurers, due to the fighting in the
NHL the insurers could invoke the exclusion to avoid indemnifying the
League. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the League’s insurers will
be able to avoid their duty to defend.
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RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE DUTY TO DEFEND

Under a CGL policy, the insurer is obligated to defend and
indemnify its insured.133 These two duties are integrated because the insurer
will have a stronger incentive to defend fully if it will be held financially
responsible through a duty to indemnify if it loses the case. Courts have
viewed the duty to defend as broader than the duty to indemnify.134
Because an insurer’s obligation to defend is broader, an insurer may be
“contractually bound to defend despite not ultimately being bound to
indemnify.”135 This situation often arises when it comes to light during
litigation that the insured is not factually or legally liable or that the
occurrence is outside the policy’s coverage.136 Specifically, an insurer
could be required to defend its insured throughout litigation and at the
conclusion of trial obtain a ruling that provides that the claims are outside
of the policy’s coverage, and thus the insurer would not be required to
indemnify its insured.
A. DUTY TO DEFEND
The typical language establishing the insurer’s duty to defend in a
CGL policy provides,
We will have the right and duty to defend the insured
against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we
will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit”
seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage”
to which the insurance does not apply. We may, at our
discretion, investigate any occurrence and settle any claim
or “suit” that may result . . . .137
133
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The scope of the insurer’s duty to defend depends on the nature of the
allegations set forth in the complaint and not on the ultimate basis of the
liability of the insured.138 Typically, the duty to defend is determined by the
“eight-corners” rule.139 Under the eight-corners rule, when an insured is
sued by a third party, the insurer must determine its duty to defend from the
terms of the policy and the pleadings of the third-party claimant.140 Most
courts do not allow insurers to examine evidence outside the four corners
of these two documents.141 Thus, looking exclusively at the allegations that
the players have made against the NHL, since there is a claim for
negligence, the insurers will likely be required to defend.
This conclusion is also supported by the Supreme Court of
California’s decision in Gray, in which the court held that an insurer had a
duty to defend its insured despite the fact that the complaint stated that the
insured intentionally caused bodily injury.142 In Gray, the court focused on
the specific CGL policy in which the insurer made two promises:
[1.] To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury or property damage, and [2.] the
company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging
such bodily injury or property damage and seeking
damages which are payable under the terms of this
endorsement, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false, or fraudulent.143
The Court in Gray concluded that without further clarification, the insured
would reasonably expect that the insurer would defend him against lawsuits
seeking damages for bodily injury, whatever the alleged cause of the injury,
whether intentional or inadvertent.144
138
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A minority of jurisdictions permit insurers to consider evidence
outside of the complaint and the policy in evaluating the duty to defend.145
However, even in those jurisdictions, examining outside information would
likely prove insufficient in persuading a court to determine that the insurers
do not have a duty to defend the League.
B. INSURERS’ DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Theoretically, the insurer is not forced to defend the insured if the
insurer believes the claims alleged against it would not be covered under
the insured’s policy. One option the insurer possesses is to deny its duty to
defend. If the insurers refused to defend in the case at bar, the NHL would
have two options. First, it could settle the cases to avoid the risk of
potentially losing an exorbitant amount of money at trial. Second, the NHL
could litigate the case. In the first hypothetical situation, if any of the
insurers refused to defend the NHL and a judgment was rendered against
the NHL, the insurer would no longer have the ability to re-litigate any
factual issues.146 Moreover, if the NHL could demonstrate that it made a
reasonable settlement in good faith and its insurers wrongfully refused to
defend it, then the insurers would be required to compensate the League for
that settlement.147 In the second scenario, if the League could prove that the
insurers wrongfully refused to defend it, the insurer would also be required
to compensate the League for the verdict and the cost of litigation.148
Since these methods of refusing to defend are precarious, insurers
typically file a motion for declaratory judgment in which they ask a court to
determine whether they have a duty to defend. Nevertheless, courts
typically will not grant declaratory relief if the issues giving rise to the
conflict between the insured and insurer are entangled with the issues that
will ultimately determine whether the insurer is liable to the
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policyholder.149 Just as many insurers filed motions for declaratory
judgment in the NFL concussion litigation, it is likely that the NHL’s
insurers and the hockey teams’ individual insurers will file similar motions
seeking to avoid defending and/or indemnifying the League or the teams.
VII.

CONCLUSION

It is likely that in the near future other contact sport organizations
will follow the lead of the NFL and NHL players, as many participants in
other popular American sports such as wrestling, rugby, soccer, and
lacrosse “all risk exposure to brain injur[ies] that range from asymptomatic
subconcussive blows to symptomatic concussion[s] to more moderate or
severe traumatic brain injur[ies].”150
Regardless of what contact sport organizations engage in concussion
litigation, however, all of the insureds will likely turn to their insurers to
both defend and indemnify them. While it will behoove insurers insuring
contact sport organizations that have yet to bring this type of concussion
litigation to be proactive in amending their policies, insurers in the current
NHL concussion litigation will not necessarily be required to indemnify the
League. One of the main reasons the League may be able to avoid
indemnification is due to the fighting that takes place in the League.
Insurers may be successful in demonstrating that the League intended
and/or expected that its players were at a heightened risk to suffer from
neurodegenerative diseases and be able to avoid indemnifying the League
against the players since bare-knuckle fighting has been part of the sport
since its inception.151 If the League’s insurers were able to avoid
indemnification and the League was required to pay for this litigation by
itself, it could conceivably self-insure due to its vast revenues.152
Nonetheless, depending on how large of an award the players received, this
149
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litigation could be very problematic for the League as the game of hockey
could become less profitable after this litigation if it eliminates or largely
limits the fighting that fans have come to expect.
Conversely, if the insurers are required to indemnify the League, it
will be costly for the insurers, especially in the event that a continuous
trigger theory is used, which will trigger more policies. Despite potentially
costing insurers more, courts should implement this trigger theory, as it is
the most appropriate trigger for these cases presenting latent harm as it best
comports with the League’s reasonable expectations and addresses the
difficulty of ascertaining the timing of the players’ injuries. In the future,
contact sport insurers, including the NFL’s and NHL’s insurers, who wish
to avoid a court implementing a continuous trigger may modify their
policies to identify a specific trigger in relation to concussions or include
additional language to clearly limit their liability to a discrete moment.
While the League’s insurers may avoid indemnifying it, since the
underlying complaint alleges negligence and other claims that could be
covered by the insurance policies, it appears likely that the League’s
insurers will be required to defend it. But it is also likely that both the
NHL’s and NFL’s concussion cases will settle.
Although it is likely that both of these concussion cases may fail to
ever reach trial, these two lawsuits will have an undeniable impact reaching
past insurance law and touching on all contact sports in the United States.
Parents now consider football and hockey more dangerous for their
children than ever before, and players now realize that there are serious
long-term risks that could affect their quality of life associated with playing
these sports. Thus, while this litigation will greatly affect insurers and their
relationship with contact sport organizations, it will also change two of the
most popular American sports for generations to come.

